guidance

Note-to-self: MNM van KSZ (Minimale normen – Sociale Zekerheid)

Minimale Normen / Normes Minimales van de KSZ (Kruispuntbank van de Sociale Zekerheid) gebaseerd op de ISO27001/ISO27002

“De toepassing van de minimale normen informatieveiligheid en privacy is verplicht voor instellingen van sociale zekerheid overeenkomstig artikel 2, eerste lid, 2° van de wet van 15 januari 1990 houdende oprichting en organisatie van een Kruispuntbank van de Sociale Zekerheid (KSZ). Bovendien moeten de minimale normen informatieveiligheid en privacy eveneens toegepast worden door alle organisaties die deel uitmaken van het netwerk van de sociale zekerheid overeenkomstig artikel 18 van deze wet. Tenslotte kan het sectoraal comité van de sociale zekerheid en van de gezondheid de naleving van de minimale normen informatieveiligheid en privacy ook opleggen aan andere instanties dan de hogervermelde.  ”

Bookmark:

(NL) https://www.ksz-bcss.fgov.be/nl/gegevensbescherming/informatieveiligheidsbeleid

(FR) https://www.ksz-bcss.fgov.be/fr/protection-des-donnees/politique-de-securite-de-linformation

(edit)

Opmerking: voor alle duidelijkheid, op zich zijn deze documenten geen nieuwigheid maar buiten de SZ zijn deze normen minder gekend… vandaar dat het toch nuttig is om ze bij te houden als geheugensteun en referentie. Je komt er sneller mee in contact als je denkt…

Cybersecurity voor vrijeberoepen en KMO (Webinar bij VLAIO)

Afgelopen vrijdag 21 februari, organiseerde Agentschap Innoveren & Ondernemen een praktisch webinar over Cybersecurity.

We toonden een vernieuwende aanpak die de zelfredzaamheid en veerkracht bij KMO’s inzake cybersecurity helpt vergroten.

Cybersecurity wordt beschouwd als één van de grootste bekommernissen in het huidige ondernemerschap. De veiligheid van (klanten)gegevens is een topprioriteit en een beleid hieromtrent uitwerken is noodzakelijk. Als adviseur zult u wel vaker de vraag krijgen van uw klanten over hoe ze hiermee aan de slag moeten gaan.

Hartelijk dank Melissa Gasthuys als gastvrouw en Eveline Borgermans voor de perfecte begeleiding en opname bij Agentschap Innoveren & Ondernemen

Hier de link naar de slides

De link naar de opname:

En je kan altijd nog even gaan kijken op cybervoorkmo.be voor meer tips en hints.

Note-to-self: logging policy considerations

Few days ago I got a question from a security officer for guidance on event and system logging.

What I can recommend: a good guideline and indication is this from OWASP.
You know OWASP is THE reference for software security …. with their OWASP top 10 etc.

Check this: https://owasp.org/www-project-cheat-sheets/cheatsheets/Logging_Cheat_Sheet

Another reference from NIST see below, very handy.

These are fairly complete in terms of guideline.

What you should pay special attention to from a policy point of view is

Special accounts

  •  Sensitive accounts
    • Highly priviliged accounts
    • Admin accounts
    • Service accounts
  • Sensitive systems
    • Domain controllers
    • Application servers
  • Sensitive data
    • HR data
    • Finance data
    • Legal data

Regarding the classification of accounts, check these:

For the users you also have to think carefully about events

  • Large volume of failed logons from sensitive users, may indicate
    • Attack
    • Denial of service
    • Hacking
  • Attack on the password database, large volumes of password change attempts …
    •  Smart password ‘testers’ will stay just below the blocking limit ..
  • Successful logons from special accounts at abnormal places or times
  • Changing the rights of sensitive accounts
    • Promotion of regular users to admins or other sensitive accounts in AD or central database

CLASSIFICATION

Make sure you have a data, user and system classification policy.
Define roles and / or categories.
Which objects are “not important”, “not sensitive”, sensitive, important, critical.
The protection must be tailored to the category type.

STORAGE

In addition, you should also write a policy on saving data.
This often poses a logistical problem with disk space.

If you know that sometimes attacks are only detected after 200-300 days, you should be able to do a forensic investigation in that period.
But that does not have to be on live data, if it is in backup, that is also good.

In terms of operational data you have to decide how much should be available immediately, for immediate consultation.
For example, that can be 1 month. (if the system can save so much)

BACKUP

Ensure that a backup can be guaranteed for a year (combination of full / differential and / or incremental backups or virtual snapshots …)
This is not a fixed period, but depending on risk management this may be more or less.

IMPORTANT: Time synchronization

Also make sure that you require NTP time synchronization, so that the clocks are exactly matched to each other on all systems.
Log analysis is impossible without correct timing.

SECURITY

Ensure that logs on source systems cannot be deleted by administrators.
Ensure that the logs following are shielded from system owners;
Ideally, you are obliged to store logs centrally (for example in a SIEM system).

Secure backups

Consider managed encryption of data and backups (not ransomware or malware).

Healthy logging and healthy backups

Make sure to test backups and restores!

Check the logs and backup for malware.

LOG CENTRALIZATION

Store logs centrally with sufficient storage capacity, security and backup.

LOG MANAGEMENT

A good management process and regular inspection must become mandatory.
Ensure monitoring for special events or special trends (sudden growth or sudden decrease or disappearance of logs)

Arrange forensic surveillance / detention if a burglary or data breach may need to be reported to the government / DPA / police.

The NIST documentation below provides useful hints and tips about the type of systems, routers, switches, firewalls, servers …

LEGISLATION

Take into account legislation such as GDPR or ePrivacy or others that impose your obligations (legal, judicial, international, fed gov, …)

EXPERIENCE

View and learn from past incidents and known use cases or accidents, which give a clear hint of what protect first.

PDCA – plan-do-check-act

Require a regular review of the policy and the rules, ensure that the guidelines are updated to the requirements and changing situations.

It is difficult if you find out after the facts that your log is not working properly.

Other references

And this is also a reference (NIST)

Please be aware of EUDT. BE unethical and dirty domain sales tricks (EN version)

fraudwarning

For the last 2 months I have been receiving some fraudulent, unethical and threatening mails from a company named “European Domains & Trademarks”, with the e-mail domain EUDT.BE, registered company name “Domeinnaam Register”.

The company is linked to: http://www.domeinnaamregister.com/ en http://www.nederlandsdomeinregister.nl/
In the Netherlands the company is registered as KVK: 64626679 and VAT: NL201158802B01. (as published on their website, the commerce register and DNS registrar).

The company is making false claims and is using unethical practices, and scaring people to extort money and scamming people into ridiculous expensive and fraudulent contracts.

The official registration owner of this URL and company is a Dutch company that is a very well known for very bad scamming practices.
And also the Belgian domain registration authority is warning for this company:
https://www.dnsbelgium.be/en/news/watch-out-domain-name-offers-domeinnaamregistercom

This is not their first warning, it already was reported in 2013 and 2016 (see below).

Also in the Netherlands, this organization is known and has been reported for the same malpractices before, like:

What it is about?

See full text at end of this post.

In short, he company contacts people, entrepreneurs, company owners pretending that they received a request to register a domain name (like company.nl) similar to the company domain you already registered (like company.com) and that they are legally forced to contact you to offer the first registration.

Next they say that they are obliged to register and protect the domain name for 10 year for €19.75 (ex VAT!) per year. And you need to pay this in one shot.

And a lot more bullshit in the mail…

What should you do?

  • DO NOT react to the mail, and ignore the mail,
  • before deleting the mail: report these practices to the authorities (eg Ministry of Economic Affairs)

If you really want that domain

  • DO NOT react to the mail, ignore the mail, delete the mail
  • contact your favorite, official and trusted registrar and by the domain via the regular / official channel

Why is this bullshit?

Please be aware that

  • domain registration is on a “first come, first serve” basis (unless it’s a malicious registration to harm a target company)
  • domains like .BE,  .NL, EU… cost about €6, €8, … 12 EUR per year.
  • Some registrars offer decent discounts, so it can be even cheaper.
  • You can renew domains YEARLY, no need to pay 10 years upfront.

See also

(BE-NL) Verkooptrucs met domeinnamen (*) (Credits: Dries Van Giel op 15 juni 2018)

More information

Credits: Dries Van Giel (*)

Belgium

Official warnings by DNS.BE

Official registrars

Warnings from official domain registrars and site hosters (no strings attached!)

Log a complaint at

If you’re already been caught by these #holes, you can register a complaint at: https://meldpunt.belgie.be/meldpunt/nl/welkommeldpunt.belgie.be

Netherlands

Full text (NL)

(Source: Happywebsites)

Geachte heer/mevrouw ,

Recent hebben wij telefonisch contact met u op proberen te nemen. Dit is tot op heden nog niet gelukt. We sturen u dus een email met daarin informatie over het volgende:
We hebben een aanvraag binnen gekregen om de website http://www.questforsecurity.eu te laten registreren. We zien in ons systeem dat u de eigenaar bent van http://www.questforsecurity.be. Helaas kan dit voor u in de toekomst verstrekkende gevolgen hebben. We zijn daarom dus wettelijk verplicht om contact met u op te nemen om u het eerste registratierecht te bieden. Dit houdt in dat wij de aanvraag van de derde partij afwijzen en de website:

http://www.questforsecurity.eu

Na een akkoord zullen doorlinken naar:

http://www.questforsecurity.be

Het komt er op neer dat u de eerste optie op de domeinnaam krijgt, dit om eventuele problemen in de toekomst te voorkomen. De aanvraag is gedaan vanuit de regio Antwerpen.
Doorgaans zijn wij verplicht om de domeinnaam voor 10 jaar vast te leggen en te beschermen. De jaarlijkse prijs voor de .EU extensie is € 19,75 per jaar. Dit betekent dus een eenmalig bedrag van €197,50. Wanneer de doorlink voltooid is, zal al het verkeer wat naar de .EU extensie gaat, automatisch op uw .BE extensie terecht komen. De verwerking hiervan duurt maximaal 24 uur. Deze domeinnaam is dan wereldwijd bereikbaar. De derde partij wordt afgewezen en deze kan niks met uw domeinnaam doen.
Overige informatie:

U ontvangt een eenmalige factuur van €197,50 exclusief BTW voor een looptijd van 10 jaar.

Na een jaar kan het ten alle tijden geannuleerd worden. U krijgt dan het resterende aantal jaren op uw rekening teruggestort.

Indien u hiermee akkoord gaat, stuur dan binnen 24 uur na ontvangen van deze email een akkoord per mail naar met daarin uw naam, en factuurgegevens naar; bart@eudt.be
Hierop volgend gaan wij de derde partij afwijzen en de doorlink in orde maken. U krijgt dezelfde dag nog alles per mail toegestuurd met alle informatie die u nodig heeft.

Met vriendelijke groeten,

Bart Mulder
European Domains & Trademarks
http://www.eudt.be
bart@eudt.be

And also


Reynaud Laurent
European Domains & Trademarks
http://www.eudt.be
reynaud.laurent@eudt.be

Better be smart.
Be safe.

And I hope these ### will be stopped sooner than later.

Note-to-self: prepping for CSA CCSK v4 upgrade

Note-to-self: extended reprint of a LinkedIn post…

I might have mentioned it already, but if you have passed the CCSK exam before, better logon to your CCSK profile on the CSA website and check if you still have an exam token left.

By default you get 2 tokens each exam registration, so…

If you pass your exam the first time, the “second try” backup token is left unused in your profile.

And (if not yet expired) you can use it to upgrade your CCSK to v4.

Tokens stay valid for 2 years after purchase.

More info: https://ccsk.cloudsecurityalliance.org/en/faq

On that page you can also find the required study material for the exam.

You can download the CCSK v4 prep kit from : https://downloads.cloudsecurityalliance.org/ccsk/CCSKv4_Exam_Preparation_Kit.zip

It’s an online exam and thus open book exam, using the below reference guides.

But realise:  60 questions in 90 minutes still is hard work, so better do some prep work up front to maximize your chances.

Once you pass this one, you can go for the (ISC)² CCSP with more confidence…

GDPR: direct marketing vs natural/legal persons

Just a quick hint if you want to contain legal spam under GDPR.

Recital (14) “The protection afforded by this Regulation should apply to natural persons, whatever their nationality or place of residence, in relation to the processing of their personal data. This Regulation does not cover the processing of personal data which concerns legal persons and in particular undertakings established as legal persons, including the name and the form of the legal person and the contact details of the legal person. ”

Recital (26) “The principles of data protection should apply to any information concerning an identified or identifiable natural person. ”

In short, GDPR only applies to natural persons (people breathing), not to legal person (like, the thing with a VAT number or company registration nr).

So: Companies/legal persons can be legally contacted or spammed.

Conclusion: use a general mail address (like info@ or company@) in all non-personal company registrations and contact details, white pages, yellow pages, VAT or government paperwork…

Make sure your official company registration DOES NOT refer to a personal address.

And as owner or delegate, keep your mail address for your personal professional communication, eg signature with personally identifiable contact details (mail, phone, mobile, skype, IM, …).

Because then your personal mail account is related to an identified and identifiable natural person, and covered by GDPR, protected from direct marketing violations. Should be.

That alphabet of Security starts with I of “Identity”

It’s an understatement to say security is moving fast, it’s changing very rapidly and the pressure to keep up with it, increases too.

From various angles, people in IT (as in Information Technology), are under fire to keep the infrastructure secure. Cloud is getting mature, new features pop up every week.
It’s almost a contradiction, but also legislation is catching up to close the holes regarding the protection of people’s security and privacy.

In many cases, the first reaction of customers, management, ITPros, Developers, DevOps,… is to look for the ultimate and ideal tool that will help to plug the security hole.

But if you only focus on the tooling, you’ll discover rather sooner than later, it is not sufficient to get your security watertight.
One of the basic reasons is that tools can’t be implemented properly without involving people and processes. I don’t need to explain the PPT (people-proces-technology) or PPP (people-proces-products) triade, right?

Lots of security management approaches and certifications handle this triad (ISO27001, CISSP, … I’ll cover that another time.

(credits: smart picture of ITGovernance.co.uk)

Rather than diving into the search for a tool, you better take a step back and consider first.

What’s the primary function of security?
Protecting an item that you want to keep (safe), right?

[The reason (“why”) for keeping it safe = the CIA triad, Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability]

When you think about the processes (“how”) to secure  an asset (anything that is worth securing), there are 3 basics actions you need to define

  • authorization: what you can do with the asset (the CRUD stuff, create/read/update/delete)
  • identification: who needs the authorization?
  • authentication: the method to proof your identity (using passwords, passes, cards, 2FA, MFA, …)

This is essentially the foundation of my credo “no security without identity”

Just by interpreting the basic components of security, you directly hit the “PROCESS” part of the PPT triad.
Now, here’s were most technical people get into trouble… not knowing how to put this in practice.

But let me ask you a simple question: within the normal, usual businesses or companies, where does the identity process typically start?
Yes, correct, HR (Human Resources)

The second question: can you name at least 2 typical high-level HR processes (for people).
Answer: something like “hire” and “fire”, or synonyms like “onboarding/off-boarding”, “termination”, “end-of-life” (but that sounds pretty dramatic when talking about people…).

These 2 events announce the beginning and the end of a lifecycle, the identity lifecycle.
And to make it complete, you also need to define the life-in-between as people change over time.

BTW, just a small side step here: this does not apply to humans only, but any other asset in your environment has pretty much the same cycle and it does not matter if it’s considered “IT” or not… computer, certificates, smart cards, disks, tapes, … but also cars, documents, …

This idea to consider the lifecycle as universal, is a great approach to explain the “identity lifecycle” to non-techies that get involved in the identity lifecycle processes.

This is the common ground you can use to talk to HR people, business managers, Executive level, …

Now, if you look on the internet for pictures on identity lifecycle management, you’re smashed with a lot of complex schemas…

google_identitylifecycle

Many of results are variations of 3 essential processes

hire-change-fire1

Depending on your background you might name them differently, like:

1AA.png

For the sake of simplicity, when teaching IDM and security workshops I usually only keep the keywords “Hire”, “Change” and “Fire”.
Short and easy to remember for most people.

For your understanding, the circle approach  would assume you start over again after the “Fire” block, but that’s not always the case. The cycle might stop.
So, the approach below is easier to visualize for most people.

Clockwise:

  1. Starting the cycle at (1),
  2. updating the identity at (2),
  3. exiting the cycle at (3)

hire-change-fire2

As I mentioned, earlier, virtually any IT or asset related proces is basically working like this.

Now, let’s take it a step further… How does identity management control security?

A first thing to consider is the typical length of the hire-change-fire modules.

How many tasks/steps does it usually take to complete each of the 3 steps?
Keep the asset in mind and keep it simple…

Typical actions in a hire process:

  • signing contract
  • getting an network/AD account
  • getting an email address
  • getting building access
  • IT stuff (laptop, …)

Pretty straight forward…
How much time would it take, in simple cases to start working?  Hours if not days.

What about the change process? For example, you get promotion to team lead or head of department…

  • hand over your tasks to peers
  • get ramped up on new job
  • in some cases, there is segregation of duties, getting rid of existing rights permissions
  •  getting access to new environment
  • changing communications channels (notifications to stakeholders of change)

In reality, this usually takes a few weeks.

And what are the typical things your consider for the “fire” process?

  • informing stakeholders/customers
  • disabling the account
  • changing password
  • lock account
  • removing access
  • extracting documentation form personal storage
  • move documents to manager or team
  • handing over ownership
  • knowledge transfer
  • data backup/archiving
  • cleaning the mailbox
  • deleting the account (* not always allowed for various reasons)
  • sending legal / tax documents
  • and more…

As you can understand, this entire termination process might take months… In many situations the termination process must be executed in different steps, like:

  • Disabling the account till x+30 days (for example, revert in case the person gets a renewal)
  • Removing access on x+60 days
  • Kill mailbox on X+90
  • Remove the account on X+1y (or even: never)

In some cases accounts must be kept for legal reasons or tracking/cybersecurity reasons…

The further you go in the lifecycle, you need to combine more tasks, and tasks or decisions get more complex.

Overall you can distinguish 2 properties of these processes: duration and complexity. Both go up.

complexity

procesduration

Now, when considering security, why is this important?
Instead of discussing the impact of successful processes, it’s easier to find out what happens if it fails.

WHAT IF… (the process fails)??

Let’s run through the cycle again….

What if the “Hire” process fails?

  • you can’t access the building
  • you do not get an account
  • you can’t logon
  • you can’t access documents

Basically, on your first (few) day(s) you can’t work. Sorry!
But what’s the balance for security: just great, because the risk is nearly 0, except for a bad start and a bit of reputation damage..
At the end: you can’t do any harm, essentially.

In case of the “change” process, a larger part of the tasks and operations will impact the security posture.

When your “change” process fails,  for example

  • you can still access your old documents
  • you get more access (eg collecting access of your old and new role)
  • you start collection sensitive accesses over time
  • managers don’t know
  • user profiles get copied from existing colleagues in the same team (no ‘reset’ or the permissions before the new ones are assigned)

So for this second piece of the circle, the impact might be significant, over time.

But for the “end-of-life” the story is completely different, a failing “deprovisioning” scenario has major impact on the business and IT process

  • accounts stay active
  • accounts not being disabled
  • access not removed
  • active accounts not detected
  • account with highly privileged access still active
  • accounts being deleted too soon
  • unauthorized users that have access to critical resources
  • hackers go undetected for a long time, using sleeping accounts
  • hardware not returned,
  • data stolen,
  • over-use of budgets to software licenses that are not revoked
  • access badges allow unauthorized access to your building and environment
  • failure to ‘deprovision’ old hard disks properly expose your company data to interested (unauthorized) parties…
  • …,

It’s clear that a failing deprovisioning/end-of-life process has major impact on your enterprise security.

risk.png

And hackers or disgruntled employees like that.

Of course you can imagine the benefits of an efficient and effective end-of-life process. It’s the opposite.

Does that require you implement an automated identity management?
No.

That’s where ISO27001 and eg GDPR surprises a lot of people.

Once you’ve got the basic processes in place you can discuss tooling, not the other way around.

questforsecurity

You have
no security without managing your identity.

you want
no identity without security.

Did I mention  that I’ll be presenting more of this fun stuff on TechoRama 2017.
Check it out here: http://sched.co/9M94

I’m very proud to present a session on the ABC of identity: Maximizing security with 10 simple processes.